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In a replication of Miller and Wattenberg’s (1985) coding of American National
Election Studies open-ended likes/dislikes questions, respondents’ evaluations of candidates
and parties are found to be especially policy oriented in 2008 and 2012. Compared to
earlier elections without an incumbent, prospective policy evaluations were far more preva-
lent in 2008. Furthermore, voters’ comments about the candidates in 2012 were more pol-
icy oriented than the elections of 1964 and 1972 in which challengers offered a stark
policy choice to an incumbent president. We also find the public’s likes and dislikes of the
political parties focused heavily on policy considerations in the two Obama elections.
It is often said after an election that the people have spoken and scholars regularly
debate what they have said. This article replicates Miller and Wattenberg’s (1985) frame-
work for analyzing what Americans said about the candidates and parties, using the tran-
scripts from the 2008 and 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES).1 We
revisit the question of how voters frame their discussion of candidates and parties
employing data from the Obama era. Our findings reveal remarkable changes since the
time of the publication of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960). Whereas American
voters once focused on results produced by the government, in the Obama elections they
were much more inclined to try to guide future policies.
Martin P. Wattenberg is a professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine. He is
the author of two recent books on turnout in the United States: Is Voting for Young People? and Where
Have All the Voters Gone? Along with George C. Edwards III, he has coauthored 13 editions of Govern-
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First, we describe the primary research question examined in this project and the
expectations we have of the data. Next, we explain our sources of data, outlining the
advantages and disadvantages of using open-ended data and the coding scheme. We then
present our findings regarding candidate and party evaluations. Our emphasis in these
sections is on the proportion of different types of evaluations, and we also assess whether
respondents were considering candidates and parties in retrospective or prospective
terms. We find that respondents’ evaluations of both candidates and parties were far more
policy oriented in the Obama elections of 2008 and 2012 than they were in the 1952-80
period. Finally, we examine and present voters’ rationales and investigate who is most
oriented toward policy arguments.
Research Question and Expectations
There have been many changes in the political landscape since 1980, and we inves-
tigate whether evaluations of candidates and parties during the Obama elections show
change as well. Contributing primarily to the voting and campaign literature, our find-
ings will show whether rationales are the same or distinct from previous elections. We
hypothesize policy evaluations to play a greater role in 2008 and 2012 than in the years
Miller and Wattenberg coded for a variety of reasons.
To begin, the composition of the electorate has changed significantly since the
1980s due to generational replacement. Of the voting age population in 2012, 56% were
not old enough to have been eligible to vote back in 1980. Newer entrants into the elec-
torate have been socialized in a much more polarized environment with regard to policy,
as will be discussed below. In addition, they have acquired far more education than the
people they have replaced. The greater level of education attained by today’s electorate
gives more people the ability to absorb advanced concepts, such as policy stands, as
opposed to making a simple assessment of whether the nation is better or worse off (Abra-
jano 2005; Dalton 2008, chap. 1).
Furthermore, political elites have made learning about policies easier for all voters by
sorting themselves into partisan camps that now clearly differ according to many policy
stands. While there is much disagreement as to whether or not the electorate has become
more ideologically polarized (Abramowitz 2010; Fiorina 2010), there is consensus that
party elites have sorted themselves to present clear and consistent differences between the
presidential nominees, as well as most congressional candidates (Hetherington 2001; Lev-
endusky 2009). Whereas clearly conservative nominees, such as Barry Goldwater in 1964,
or clearly liberal nominees, such as George McGovern in 1972, were once anomalies, now
the electorate regularly chooses between polar opposites. In addition, Layman and Carsey
(2002) show that clear conflict between the parties now occurs on multiple fronts, encom-
passing social welfare, racial, and cultural policies. Because choices in American politics are
clearer now than they were in the period Miller and Wattenberg analyzed, we expect the
public to give policy considerations greater weight in the Obama elections.
A final reason we expect policy evaluations to have increased since the 1952-80
period is that the information environment in which political campaigns take place has
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changed markedly. Consider, for example, that many policy differences are now promi-
nently presented in policy-oriented political commercials, which have increasingly come
to dominate modern political campaigns (West 2014). Although the vast increase in
campaign spending on political commercials is often criticized as poisoning the political
environment with a spate of charges and countercharges, one positive side to more adver-
tising is that the electorate has more opportunities to be exposed to policy arguments.
Research over the years has shown that people do indeed learn a significant amount about
public policy stands from TV commercials (Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Patterson and
McClure 1976). Gilens, Vavreck, and Cohen (2007) demonstrate that the American pub-
lic’s greater focus on issues can be traced to the high level of policy content in paid politi-
cal commercials. In addition to advertising, television programming choices are now
larger than ever, and some scholars have argued that nontraditional sources of political
news, such as soft news (Baum 2005) and late night comedy shows (Parkin 2010), have
policy effects on certain segments of the public. Further, beyond television, in recent elec-
tions the Internet has made policy information widely available to large swaths of the
electorate (Tolbert and McNeal 2003). The 2008 Obama campaign, in particular, was
able to mobilize youth voters in great numbers using their digital strategy (Harfoush
2009). Given the changes in accessible campaign information, in volume, medium, and
strategy, we expect the electorate to exhibit a greater propensity toward policy arguments
made during the 2008 and 2012 elections than in the 1952-80 period.
Sources of Data: Advantages and Disadvantages
of Open-Ended Questions
In order to test our hypothesis that more Americans are now evaluating candidates
and parties in policy terms, we decided to replicate the Miller and Wattenberg (1985)
coding scheme for analyzing the open-ended questions from the ANES. An excellent way
to directly ascertain the nature of the messages people send on Election Day is simply to
ask a representative sample of citizens what was on their minds as they evaluated the can-
didates and parties. A set of eight open-ended questions in the ANES have been asked in
every presidential election dating back to 1952. This question set asks what people like
and dislike about the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees and their par-
ties. Each survey essentially involves short conversations with a random sample of the
electorate that year; people are free to say anything they want, unconstrained by the lim-
ited number of choices provided by closed-ended questions. A great benefit of the ANES
open-ended questions is that they allow respondents to identify what is most important
to them about the candidates and the parties, regardless of whether such considerations
might occur to the designers of the survey. Furthermore, people can put these considera-
tions into their own words, explaining their own reasoning for why such factors are
important to them.
However, this survey technique does have some limitations. For example, some
respondents say little or nothing to the open-ended questions, either because they are
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unable to express themselves or are reluctant to talk openly. Other respondents simply
repeat what they have heard recently from friends or encountered that day in the media.
Additionally, the possibility remains that some respondents will provide what they per-
ceive to be socially acceptable answers, rather than what is foremost on their minds. Con-
sider, for instance, that many may have been reluctant to say they were voting against
Barack Obama because of his race or because of concerns that he was a Muslim (though
we were startled by how many respondents did indeed say things like this).
For the purposes of our analysis here, there is little reason to suspect that such prob-
lems with open-ended questions are too different from one cross-section to another. Hence,
for assessing whether voters now are thinking in similar or different frameworks from past
years, these data are virtually ideal. It is exceedingly difficult to write closed-ended ques-
tions that will be relevant across many campaigns; open-ended questions resolve this diffi-
culty by leaving it to the respondents themselves to define what is most relevant.
Reading the verbatim transcripts of what respondents have said to the ANES open-
ended yields many insights into what people were thinking when they cast their votes.
Unfortunately, all but a few of the scholarly analyses of these data since 1952 have been
limited to analyzing the responses coded by the ANES, in which each individual com-
ment is classified into one of several hundred generic categories (e.g., general assessment
of economic policy; social security/pensions; foreign policies more clear-cut/decisive).
Reading the transcripts as opposed to using coded responses is akin to the advantage a
teacher gets from reading a student’s short essay as opposed to a few multiple-choice
questions. Multiple-choice answers are necessarily limited to a broad brush of generic
responses, whereas reading a few sentences can reveal one’s reasons for thinking a certain
way, as each segment builds on the others to provide insight into one’s framework of
analysis. Yet, just as with exams from a large lecture class, reading a set of essays is far
more time consuming than checking multiple-choice responses.
For our analysis of the 2008 ANES open-ended questions, we read how 2,323 ran-
domly chosen citizens responded to a series of the eight questions about the presidential
candidates and the political parties. The mean number of open-ended questions answered
was 4.04; therefore, we coded about 9,380 responses to the 2008 ANES survey. In order
to make this project more manageable, we opted to read a random half-sample of the
2012 ANES open-ended responses, thereby reducing our sample size for that year to
1,048 respondents. Our analysis of the open-ended data from 2008 revealed that taking a
random half-sample would not change any of the basic percentage distributions by more
than 2%. Hence, we are confident that our results from 2012 are almost as reliable as
those from 2008, and certainly well suited to compare to the Miller–Wattenberg find-
ings (some of which were based on roughly the same number of cases).
Given the extensive time commitment that is required to read so many open-ended
responses as recorded verbatim by the interviewers,2 it is hardly surprising that very few
2. In the 1952-80 period, responses were written down by hand on paper; in 2008 and 2012, they
were typed on a laptop. The biggest problem with the recorded responses on paper was reading the handwrit-
ing, whereas with the typed responses poor typing and spelling led to some problems in interpreting what
the respondents had said. The lack of interpretability of responses sometimes led a response to be coded as
unclear.
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investigators have taken on this task. The most notable exception is Philip Converse’s
famous coding of levels of conceptualization in 1956, which was published in The Ameri-
can Voter, and later replicated for some subsequent elections by Pierce and Hagner
(1982), Knight (1985), and Lewis-Beck et al. (2008). Another example is Miller and
Wattenberg’s (1985) article in the American Political Science Review entitled “Throwing
the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-
1980,” which this article replicates for the first time.
Miller and Wattenberg’s conceptual framework was designed to help settle the
then-current debate over whether President Ronald Reagan had received a policy man-
date in the 1980 election. Believing that they had found a useful framework for analyzing
how people approach the issues of the campaign, they then asked for and received permis-
sion from the ANES to access all of the transcripts from each of the previous presidential
election studies. They recruited many undergraduates from their courses at the Univer-
sity of Michigan to read through the microfilmed interviews from the 1952-64 period
and the original interviewers’ booklets from 1968-80 period. The decision of the ANES
to release a spreadsheet of respondents’ verbatim comments from the 2008 and 2012
time series surveys enables us to compare citizens’ evaluations of the candidates and par-
ties in the Obama elections to what Miller and Wattenberg found years ago.
The Coding Scheme
Fortunately, Miller and Wattenberg (1985) presented a detailed methodological
appendix, describing their coding scheme. In addition, the authors provided some exam-
ples of responses that they had coded as focusing on either policy or performance. These
published details guided our task of faithfully replicating the analysis with the 2008 and
2012 survey data. Miller and Wattenberg (1985, 363) wrote that “most of the comments
were relatively easy to code.” With the responses from 2008 and 2012, we found the cod-
ing process to be similar. The second author of this article conducted all of the initial cod-
ing for each year. If she had any doubt about the coding of a response, or if she had coded
the response as mixed or unclear, she put this on a list for the first author to also examine.
This cross-check led the first author to review about 10% of responses and to change
about 5% of these coding decisions.
The 2008 examples presented below illustrate responses about the candidates that
we coded as focusing on policy evaluations:
Likes Obama: New ideas and change, especially in improving economy and foreign rela-
tions, where we should have been many years ago, and he will move the country forward
with his new ideas, he has new ideas for energy, how we do things in this country and the
change for Afghanistan and our focus needs to be Afghanistan, saying many things I like. In
the past I have voted Republican and he is bringing forth the ideas I think personally that
we should be doing. (Respondent 700)
Dislikes Obama: I don’t like the idea that we should have a socialized health care. I think
somebody else can do a better job than the government. I wish he was not into creating new
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programs. I wish he was cutting programs, not making new ones. We are spending too
much. I feel like, if we all have to cut back to make ends meet, the government has to do the
same. I feel we ALL need to live within our means. (Respondent 1980)
Likes McCain: I like to vote Republican, and I agree with what he stands for, not into poli-
tics all that much, as far as Democratic Party because I am for drilling, it makes us more
independent. Health care issues—I am against free medical because it does not work; it
would not be good because it takes too long to get medical treatment even when you are in
dire need. Gas prices are bad—out of 15 gas stations only 2 had gas. Good to protect envi-
ronment—we do need gas to be able to get to work and pay our bills; drilling wells is good.
(Respondent 695)
Dislikes McCain: Under McCain I feel there is less chance of real structural change in gov-
ernment including environmental issues—land, and community and the laws we live under
are completely contradictory to natural law particularly land and each other. Communism
and socialism are closer to my politics rather than capitalism. (Respondent 349)
As can be seen, these respondents were mostly concerned about what specific deci-
sions the candidates would take once in office. Accordingly, their vote was chiefly
designed to bring into office a candidate who agreed with their basic values and would
move public policy in the direction which they preferred.
In contrast, other respondents focused more on the ends that the candidates might
achieve rather than the means. Such responses were coded as emphasizing performance.
Below are some illustrative examples of performance-oriented responses:
Likes Obama: The change; since he says he is going to change; his party will do a better
job taking us out of the crises. (Respondent 2036)
Dislikes Obama: I’m not exactly sure how well he will get things done he says he wants to
do. (Respondent 66)
Likes McCain: I feel the way he is running things he will be a good leader. He knows what
he wants to accomplish and take care of. It is going to make a difference. (Respondent 1953)
Dislikes McCain: Republicans have been in office 8 years and made a mess. (Respondent
2271)
In reading through such responses, there is little or no indication of which particular pol-
icy direction the respondent had in mind. Instead, such respondents focused primarily on
which candidate would do a better job as president or would leave the country better off
at home and/or abroad. We do not believe that such considerations are unimportant or
irrational. Concerns of who is most likely to be successful in promoting economic growth
or peace throughout the world are always central matters in presidential campaigns. Sides
and Vavreck (2013, 237) argue that such evaluations were crucial to Obama’s reelection,
writing that “the Republican Party’s loss in 2012 was mainly about performance—spe-
cifically, that Obama had ‘performed’ well enough, as judged by the fundamentals.”
Finally, a third basic way of evaluating candidates is to focus on their personal
attributes such as competence, integrity, and leadership skills. A vote for a presidential
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candidate is ultimately a choice of one person for the nation’s highest office. It should
therefore be no surprise that many responses focus squarely on the personal qualifications
of the candidates. Some examples of comments that were mostly about candidate attributes
are shown below:
Likes Obama: The way he is with his family. He has that welcome look like that if he was
friend of mine I could just sit down and talk to him. And the fact that I never thought I
would see the day when an African-American man would get this close to being president.
(Respondent 1802)
Dislikes Obama: This guy is a dark horse. Don’t know where he is really from. Who paid
for his school? We don’t know who paid for Harvard. How do you become the head of Har-
vard board if he only wrote one article? What is his connection with Black Panthers or terro-
rists? Where was he really born? (Respondent 1299)
Likes McCain: I think that his record is better than the other candidate. We have more to
look at and I believe he is more trustworthy. I am a Democrat and I usually for the man and
I look at the candidates and I vote for the man not the party. (Respondent 2013)
Dislikes McCain: His age. His not giving direct answers to questions he is asked, which
shows an issue of trust for me. (Respondent 2048)
Again, one should not discount such considerations as merely idiosyncratic ways of evalu-
ating presidential candidates. The competence, honesty, and leadership skills of a presi-
dent are often instrumental in determining whether they are able to carry out policy
promises and do a good job for the country (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986).
Following the Miller and Wattenberg coding framework, we also coded all the can-
didate responses for a time dimension, noting whether the evaluations were retrospective,
prospective, or mixed/unclear. There is much debate within the literature as to whether
voters focus mostly on the past or on the future (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Holbrook,
Clouse, and Weinschenk 2012; Woon 2012). The ability to read what verb tense
respondents chose enables us to shed light on this question.
In addition to coding the main focus of responses to the open-ended questions about
the presidential candidates, we also coded the 2008 and 2012 open-ended questions about
the Democratic Party and the Republican Party according to the same schema. Although
Miller and Wattenberg’s 1985 article only employed the data from the candidate questions,
their coders did code the party questions from 1952 to 1980. This article presents the data
that was collected in the 1980s on the likes and dislikes of the political parties for the first
time, and we compare these findings to the results we obtained from the Obama elections.
A Policy-Oriented Electorate in 2008 and 2012:
Candidate Evaluations
One of the clearest findings to emerge from Miller and Wattenberg’s analysis of
opinions about the 1952-80 presidential nominees was that the nature of the evaluations
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generally differed according to a candidate’s incumbency status. Respondents were most
likely to focus on policy matters when evaluating challengers to incumbent presidents,
and incumbents running were evaluated primarily on their performance in office. In races
without an incumbent, personal attributes dominated the comments about the two con-
tenders, with performance issues clearly being more salient than policy issues (for the spe-
cific findings for each individual year, see Miller and Wattenberg 1985).
Based on these patterns, the 2008 nonincumbent election provides a particularly
tough test for the hypothesis that voters are more policy oriented now than they were sev-
eral decades ago. As Miller and Wattenberg wrote about the lack of policy salience in
open-seat presidential races, “Comparing two new and untested policy programs may
require too much information processing for the average voter” (1985, 365). Such a con-
text certainly describes both the Obama and McCain campaigns of 2008. Furthermore,
neither candidate could be said to be in the mold of his party’s typical presidential candi-
date. Obama had served less than four years in a high political office by the time of the
2008 election, and John McCain attempted to distance his campaign from the George
W. Bush administration, labeling himself and his running mate Sarah Palin as mavericks.
The results in Table 1 show little resemblance between 2008 and the three nonin-
cumbent races analyzed by Miller and Wattenberg. When people had something to say
about why they liked or disliked Obama and McCain, roughly 40% of the time they
focused on policy matters. Averaging the three open-seat races of 1952, 1960, and 1968
yields just 13% of the responses centering on policy. In short, people’s evaluations of the
candidates in 2008 were more about the choices that the candidates were offering for the
direction of public policy than was the case in the open-seat races of the 1950s and 1960s.
The data from 2012 also point toward a more policy-oriented electorate in the
Obama era, relative to the 1952-80 time period. However, the difference from similar
past campaigns is not as stark. The presidential races with an incumbent running for
reelection, which were analyzed by Miller and Wattenberg (1956, 1964, 1972, and
1980), provided their strongest evidence for the salience of policy evaluations.
TABLE 1
A Classification of 2012 and 2008 Candidate Evaluations Compared to the 1952-80 Period
(in Percentages)
Policy Mixed/Unclear Performance Attributes
Obama 2008 40 8 10 42
McCain 2008 38 14 7 41
Candidates in open-seat
contests, 1952-68
13 4 30 54
Obama 2012 50 8 21 21
Incumbents running for
reelection, 1956-80
20 5 39 36
Romney 2012 50 7 6 36
Challengers to
incumbents,1956-80
32 5 18 45
Sources: Authors’ coding of the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 and 2012 surveys, and
Miller and Wattenberg’s (1985) coding of the 1952-80 ANES surveys.
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In particular, they found that challengers to incumbents were the most likely to be eval-
uated in policy terms, with unusually ideological candidates (for that time period) like
Goldwater and McGovern leading many respondents to make policy comments. Mitt
Romney’s 2012 campaign could scarcely be considered extreme in its policy stances—at
least by twenty-first-century standards (see Abramson et al 2014, 155). Yet, the percent-
age of comments about Romney that were classified as exclusively or primarily about pol-
icy was 50%, as compared to 46% for McGovern and 39% for Goldwater. Even more
telling is the finding that 50% of the comments about Obama in 2012 were about policy,
whereas in the 1956-80 period the highest comparable figure was 32% with regard to
Nixon.
A relative constant throughout the years for which we have data is that about two-
fifths of the responses about the candidates center on their personal attributes, such as
their political experience or perceived integrity. The 2008 data shown in Table 1 are con-
sistent with this general pattern. Even though policies were quite salient to the 2008
electorate, the personal attributes of the candidates still mattered a great deal. Responses
that centered on attributes were roughly equal in proportion to those that centered on
policies. In particular, people were especially likely to comment on Obama’s intellect,
speaking ability, and race, and about McCain’s military service, integrity, and age. By
2012, comments about Obama’s personal attributes were notably less frequent, whereas
Romney’s business background and religion generated enough comments to make the
focus on attributes almost as much as was the case for previous challengers.
The types of candidate comments that were surprisingly infrequent in the Obama
elections were those that were classified as performance based. As articulated above, there
are reasons to expect that many respondents would have used performance criteria to eval-
uate candidates in both 2008 and 2012. Incumbent presidents tend to tout any aspect of
their performance that is good, and challengers rush to criticize the results in any way
they can. On average, 39% of comments about presidents running for reelection in the
1956-80 period were about performance. In 2012 we find performance comments about
Obama were roughly half this level. Further, in the open-seat race of 2008, performance
comments about both Obama and McCain were even less (10 and 7%, respectively). In
earlier campaigns without an incumbent, many more people looked ahead to the results
they expected the candidates to deliver once in office. For example, many people said they
liked Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 because he would end the Korean War, John F. Ken-
nedy in 1960 because he would get the American economy moving again, and Richard
Nixon in 1968 because he would end the Vietnam War. With the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars continuing throughout 2008 and the American economy crashing during a key
part of the fall campaign, the conditions were certainly ripe for respondents to focus on
the candidates’ likely performance in the future.
Turning to the time dimension, we find the types of issues that the electorate
focused on in 2008 were not prospective performance, but rather prospective policy.
Table 2 brings the prospective–retrospective dimension into the analysis of what people
said about the issues (either performance or policy) when asked about the candidates. It
shows that slightly more than three-quarters of the issue-oriented responses in 2008 were
classified as being primarily about prospective policy. The contrast with the open-seat
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contests of 1952, 1960, and 1968 could scarcely be greater. In these races, issue responses
focused primarily on performance and were only slightly tilted toward the future over the
past. Lack of ties to an incumbent administration may have especially facilitated the focus
on prospective policy in 2008. Yet, in the similar situation of 1952, only 10% of issue
comments about Eisenhower and 13% of issue comments about Adlai Stevenson were
classified as being about their policies for the future.
In the 1952-80 period, prospective policy considerations were most prominent in
evaluations of challengers to incumbent presidents. Notably, the focus on prospective
policy in 2008 greatly exceeds even what was found for such candidates as Goldwater in
1964 (49%) and McGovern in 1972 (61%). In 2012, prospective policy comments made
up more than half of the issue comments about Romney. It is also noteworthy that never
before had so many of the policy comments about a challenger been retrospective. This
pattern points to a an electorate now looking at what policy promises a candidate makes
as well as the policies he has pursued in the past. For example, consider that comments
about health care, a major policy issue in 2012, encompassed Romney’s policies as gover-
nor as well as his pledge to repeal and replace Obamacare.
A Policy-Oriented Electorate in 2008 and 2012: Party Evaluations
The evidence for a more policy-oriented electorate in the Obama elections relative
to previous periods of analysis is further bolstered by our analysis of the open-ended ques-
tions about the two major political parties. As abstract entities that are bound together
by their desire to influence the course of political change, we should expect that perform-
ance and policy issues will make up the vast majority of the comments about the parties.
In contrast, because voting for a president is about voting for a person, we should expect
the attributes of the candidates to always be fairly paramount. Political parties are less
TABLE 2
A Classification of 2012 and 2008 Candidate Issue Evaluations Compared to the 1952-80 Period
(in Percentages)
Prospective
Policy
Retrospective
Policy
Prospective
Performance
Retrospective
Performance
Obama 2008 78 8 9 5
McCain 2008 76 11 5 7
Candidates in open-seat contests,
1952-68
17 12 39 32
Obama 2012 14 57 1 23
Incumbents running for reelection,
1956-80
6 26 7 62
Romney 2012 58 35 5 2
Challengers to incumbents,
1956-80
44 16 22 19
Sources: Authors’ coding of the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 and 2012 surveys, and
Miller and Wattenberg’s (1985) coding of the 1952-1980 ANES surveys.
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likely to be evaluated on their general characteristics, although sometimes attributes
such as efficient, unified, or strong are mentioned. Ultimately, only about 15% of the
comments about parties typically focus on such general attributes compared to about
45% of the responses about candidates. Thus, there has always been a clearer focus on
issue evaluations for parties than for candidates.
As with candidates, the nature of the incumbency situation is related to how
respondents’ issue comments are distributed between performance and policy. Table 3
shows that in open-seat contests, people were more likely to evaluate parties with regard
to performance than policy, whereas the reverse was true when an incumbent president
was on the ballot. Therefore, as was the case for candidates, party evaluations in the 2008
election present a very tough test for the hypothesis of a policy-oriented electorate in
recent years. Here again we find clear evidence that Americans focused more on policy in
2008 than during the 1952-80 period. Roughly two-thirds of evaluations of the Demo-
crats and Republicans in 2008 focused on policy matters as compared to about half of the
comments in previous elections with an incumbent and just 37% in open-seat races. Elec-
tions with incumbents have always drawn more policy comments regarding the parties,
thereby limiting the potential for change. Nevertheless, it is notable that nearly three-
quarters of the comments about the parties in 2012 were primarily about policies—a fig-
ure unmatched in the 1952-80 period.
Performance-based comments about parties were a relative rarity in the Obama
elections compared to the earlier period for which we have data. In The American Voter,
Campbell et al. (1960, chap. 3) show that many respondents in the 1950s had a clear
image of which party had delivered the best results at home as well as abroad. They
noted that people frequently viewed the Democrats as the party of prosperity and the
Republicans as the party of depression, whereas on foreign affairs the Republicans had
the edge as the party of peace, with the Democrats being viewed as the party of war.
Such general performance-based images of the parties were rarely found in the 2008 and
2012 data. When people discussed how the parties had handled the economic and for-
eign challenges facing the nation in the Obama elections, they were far more likely to
TABLE 3
A Classification of 2008 and 2012 Political Party Evaluations Compared to the 1952-80 Period
(in Percentages)
Policy Mixed/Unclear Performance Attributes
Democratic Party 2008 66 10 9 16
Republican Party 2008 68 7 10 15
Parties in open-seat contests, 1952-68 37 5 51 7
Democratic Party 2012 72 7 9 13
Parties of incumbents running
for reelection, 1956-80
50 9 29 13
Republican Party 2012 74 6 7 13
Parties of challengers to
incumbents, 1956-80
52 10 25 13
Sources: Authors’ coding of the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 and 2012 surveys, and
Miller and Wattenberg’s (1985) coding of the 1952-80 ANES surveys.
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discuss the specific policy paths that they had pursued than to offer general
performance-based comments.
Because parties are continuing entities that establish a reputation over time, we
should expect that people would always evaluate them more retrospectively than prospec-
tively. In the coding conducted by Miller and Wattenberg on the responses about politi-
cal parties from 1952 to 1980, retrospective evaluations were six times as numerous as
prospective evaluations. The only time that a substantial number of party comments
were prospective was in 1960, and even then retrospective evaluations represented 70%
of the comments. Our initial perusal of the data from 2008 showed no deviation from
this general pattern. Hence, we did not code the retrospective–prospective dimension for
the party comments in either 2008 or 2012.
A Policy Mandate? Comparing the 2008 and 1980 Evidence
As stated near the outset of this article, the initial motivation for Miller and Watten-
berg’s coding scheme was to assess whether or not President Reagan had received a policy
mandate during the 1980 election. Their conclusion was that the data “fail to support the
claim of a mandate for Reagan’s policy stands” (Miller and Wattenberg 1985, 359). Argu-
ably, the election of Obama led to more policy change in Washington than any election
since that of Reagan in 1980. Thus, an appropriate final test of whether the electorate in the
Obama era is actually more policy oriented than in the past is to assess the evidence for a
mandate for Obama’s policies in 2008 and 2012. Did people who voted for him focus on
the policy matters that were aired in the campaigns? Employing the same methodology of
analyzing open-ended questions as was done for the 1980 survey data, is the evidence for a
policy mandate stronger for the Obama elections than for 1980?
Table 4 compares what voters used as their rationales for their choices in the
Obama elections and 1980. We divided such rationales into reasons for voting for a can-
didate as well as reasons for voting against his opponent. In order to fully assess the man-
date question, it is important to examine both, as evidence for policy voting is stronger
if it can be shown that voters have not only endorsed one leader’s policies, but also
rejected alternative policies. Although a third of Reagan voters focused on policy as their
reason for being for him, performance assessments clearly dominated when they discussed
why they were not for Jimmy Carter. In 2008, we find policy concerns were the major
focus of comments for both why Obama voters favored him as well as opposed McCain.
Obama also enjoyed a net partisan edge on policy, as more voters employed policy as a
reason for voting for him than for McCain. By contrast, it can hardly be said that Reagan
earned a mandate given that policy comments were evenly balanced between those in
support of him and in support of Carter. In sum, the evidence for a policy mandate is
much stronger in the case of the 2008 election than for 1980.
Although we do not have policy/performance coding concerning Reagan’s reelec-
tion in 1984, the available evidence from the ANES coding scheme shows that Reagan
was propelled to a landslide reelection mostly due to the overwhelming positivity of
performance-like comments. In comparison, the specific policy comments that were
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made about Reagan were notably more negative than positive (see Wattenberg 1991,
chaps. 5 and 6). Our coding of the 2012 open-ended responses tells a much different story
regarding Obama’s narrow reelection win. Policy comments were more of a net asset than
a liability for him, whereas performance comments were more unfavorable than favorable.
Hence, Obama could well claim more of a policy mandate for his slim 2012 reelection
victory than Reagan could for his landslide 1984 reelection.
Who Are the Policy-Oriented Voters?
To better understand the nature of the electorate’s focus on policy considerations in
2008 and 2012, we created a variable measuring the percentage of open-ended responses that
were coded as primarily concerning policy. This variable ranges in value from 0 to 100 and is
necessarily limited to the respondents who said something codeable to at least one of the eight
questions about the presidential candidates and the political parties. Table 5 displays a set of
multiple regression equations, which explain some of the variation in how much people
focused their 2008 and 2012 comments on policy as opposed to performance or attributes.
We hypothesized that one of the major reasons for the electorate’s focus on policy in
the Obama elections was the sorting of Democratic and Republican officeholders into rela-
tively coherent ideological blocks. To test this hypothesis, we combined two highly related
variables into an index of knowledge about party positions to capture this effect. The index
TABLE 4
Voters’ Rationales: 2012 and 2008 Compared to 1980 (in Percentages)
Policy Mixed Performance Attributes Nothing
Obama 2012 Voters’ Rationales
Like Obama 51 7 11 17 13
Dislike Romney 44 5 3 26 21
Obama 2008 Voters’ Rationales
Like Obama 40 7 13 25 15
Dislike McCain 37 14 4 22 23
Reagan 1980 Voters’ Rationales
Like Reagan 33 6 25 14 22
Dislike Carter 15 6 47 21 11
Romney 2012 Voters’ Rationales
Like Romney 34 10 8 30 19
Dislike Obama 41 6 25 21 7
McCain 2008 Voters’ Rationales
Like McCain 25 14 8 39 13
Dislike Obama 33 6 3 43 15
Carter 1980 Voters’ Rationales
Like Carter 15 5 23 43 14
Dislike Reagan 36 1 11 33 20
Sources: Authors’ coding of the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 and 2012 surveys, and
Miller and Wattenberg’s (1985) coding of the 1980 ANES survey.
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includes whether respondents saw major differences between the parties and whether they
knew which party is more conservative. This knowledge index did prove to be a highly sig-
nificant predictor of an increased focus on policy concerns in both 2008 and 2012.
In addition, we included in the model a variety of measures and correlates with
political involvement. These were (1) interest in the campaign; (2) being a strong parti-
san; (3) being interviewed after the first debate, and hence more likely to be exposed to
policy arguments; and (4) years of education, which presumably gives people a better
capacity to absorb policy arguments. We found relationships between each of these meas-
ures in one or the other year. In 2008, being a strong partisan and being interviewed after
the first debate were significant predictors of an increased focus on policies. As we sus-
pected, this finding suggests that understanding the choices presented, as well as expo-
sure to information, are important factors for evaluating candidates in policy terms. In
2012, with reduced excitement about the campaign compared to the historic campaign
four years earlier, we find significant effects from interest in the campaign and years of
education. These effects, though found in different measures, are consistent with the find-
ings from 2008. People interested in the campaign are more likely to be exposed to infor-
mation about policy, and the education finding indicates that the capacity to evaluate
policy arguments is likely a prior condition to policy evaluations.
Due to generational replacement, we also expected to find a significant relationship
between age and a focus on policy concerns, as younger people have been politically social-
ized in an age of more polarized parties. Indeed, the results of the multivariate analysis in
both 2008 and 2012 strongly confirm this hypothesis. The age coefficient translates into a
difference in policy focus between an 80-year-old and a 20-year-old of 18% in 2008 and
14% in 2012, with younger respondents being more policy oriented. This wide age gap
indicates that we may well be seeing a generational sea-change in how voters evaluate can-
didates and parties. People who first voted in the so-called issueless 1950s are being
replaced in the electorate by their grandchildren, who have received their political social-
ization in a much more polarized environment, replete with hotly debated policy issues.
Finally, we provide an alternate model specification for each year that accounts for
the variation in the number of questions each respondent answered. We find the number
of questions answered, which ranges from 0 to 8, is associated with a positive, statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of being policy oriented in 2008. For 2012 we find no
significant effect, and in both years the addition of this variable to the previously specified
model does not change the substance of our findings.
Conclusion and Discussion
This article has documented the way Americans evaluated parties and candidates in
the past two presidential elections. Compared to the period from 1952 to 1980, such
evaluations were clearly more policy oriented in the elections won by Obama. During the
2008 campaign, the economy faced a greater crisis than had been seen in any presidential
election since the Great Depression of 1932. Yet, in the midst of this crisis, voters dis-
cussed more about the policy direction the candidates and parties would take than the
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basic question of who would do the best job of handling the situation. Four years later in
2012, the candidates disagreed sharply as to whether Obama had performed adequately
in meeting the economic crisis. Nevertheless, voters’ rationales for liking or disliking the
candidates and parties centered much more on policy questions than the simple matter of
performance
To call the Obama-era electorate policy oriented, however, does not necessarily
require today’s electorate to be politically sophisticated. Over and over again, as we read
through the interview protocols, we were struck by how people’s responses often reflected
a paucity of political knowledge. Many people mentioned one or more policy matters but
with a bare minimum of words and details. Others said more, but often their extended
comments made it even clearer that they did not know that much about public policy.
Having carefully read the open-ended responses of 3,384 randomly chosen individuals
for this article, it is hard to argue with the conclusion of Lewis Beck et al. (2008, 425) in
The American Voter Revisited that most voters “are ‘cognitive misers’ learning only as much
as they have to in order to decide how to vote.”
Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) replicated the famous levels of conceptualization scheme
from The American Voter and found that ideological thinking was not much more evident in
the open-ended responses from the 2000 ANES study than in the 1950s. Although ideo-
logical conceptualization addresses an important question in political science, namely,
whether voters are employing the liberal/conservative framework that political elites rely
on, it is not intended to measure whether or not people are trying to guide the direction of
future public policies. The Miller–Wattenberg framework is specifically designed to hone
in on whether respondents are using policy, performance, or attributes as their main crite-
rion for liking or disliking each candidate and party. Because we ask a more precise research
question, which demands less from individual respondents, we find more change over time
than Lewis-Beck et al. did in The American Voter Revisited. One need not be an ideologue or
a near-ideologue in order to take policy into account in one’s voting decision.
In The American Voter, Campbell et al. (1960, 541) noted that “[t]he public’s
explicit task is to decide not what government shall do but rather who shall decide what
government shall do.” Our data demonstrate that compared to the era analyzed in The
American Voter more Americans in the Obama era tried to guide what the government
should do when they cast their votes. Campbell et al. (1960, 545) concluded that,
“However great the potential ability of the public to enforce a set of concrete policy
demands at the polls, it is clear that this power is seldom used in American politics.” If
the 2008 and 2012 survey data are typical of elections in the twenty-first century, such a
conclusion is now inoperative. We expect future elections to shed further light on this
question. In 2008, 82% of those who voted for Obama answered at least one of the candi-
date or party questions in a way that focused on policy to justify their vote, and the same
percentage was found for McCain voters; in 2012, 86% of Obama voters offered a policy
comment that explained their vote, and 79% of Romney voters did so.3 As we should
3. Voters were asked four questions in which they could justify their vote (e.g., for Obama voters (1)
likes Obama, (2) dislikes McCain, (3) likes Democratic Party, (4) dislikes Republican Party). The average
number of responses that were classified as policy ranged from 1.7 for McCain voters in 2008 to 2.1 for
Obama voters in 2012.
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expect, among each candidate’s supporters, there was a wide degree of variance as to what
particular policy messages were being sent. Yet, not all voters have to focus on the exact
same elements of a candidate’s platform in order to have “enforced policy demands at the
polls,” to use The American Voter’s phrase.
Nor does it necessarily require a good deal of education or political interest to be
classified as policy voter in the framework we have employed here. We found that reliance
on policy assessments was significantly higher among the better educated and more polit-
ically interested respondents in just one of the two Obama elections. These patterns were
far too weak to account for the substantial movement toward a more policy-oriented elec-
torate that we found. A much better explanation for why the electorate is now more
focused on policy evaluations is V. O. Key’s classic echo chamber analogy. As Key (1966,
2) wrote, “The voice of the people is but an echo chamber. The output of an echo chamber
bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. As candidates and parties clamor
for attention and vie for popular support, the people’s verdict can be no more than a selec-
tive reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks presented to them.” In the elec-
tions analyzed by Campbell et al. (1960, 1966), the candidates were deliberately vague as
to how they would accomplish the goals they set out. For example, Eisenhower famously
said in 1952 that he would go to Korea, but he never articulated what policies he would
implement to bring the war to a conclusion. Without any concrete policy alternatives
being discussed, the focus of people’s evaluations was naturally more on the ends rather
than the means. In contrast, in 2008 Obama offered a clear policy contrast to the policies
of McCain regarding how to end the war in Iraq. In both 2008 and 2012, the contenders
clearly differed on policies like health care coverage, abortion, income tax rates, and
a host of other stands. As for the parties, whereas roughly 50% of the electorate consis-
tently thought there were important differences in what they stood for throughout
the 1952-80 period, in the elections of 2008 and 2012, this percentage had risen to
nearly 80%. In short, a clearer policy message from the candidates and the parties has
resulted in an electorate that is more focused on policies in its decision making relative to
previous eras.
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